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The Interagency Active Measures Working Group was a group led by the United States Department of State and later by the United States Information Agency (USIA). 〔 The group was formed early during the Reagan administration, in 1981, when some mid-level officials in the U.S. Department of State sought a more robust effort to counter aggressive Soviet propaganda.〔 Some believe also that the group was created because active measures experts in the CIA wanted an outlet for their findings that could be more overt and credible than those of the CIA.〔 Representatives of the CIA, FBI, Department of Defense, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Justice, and the United States Information Agency were among the government agencies that served in the group.〔 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Dennis Kux, was the group's first chairman. The group's activities did not address the full range of Soviet active measures. Instead, its focus was countering Soviet disinformation.〔 The Active Measures Working Group developed an approach that expanded the U.S. Government's monitoring of Soviet disinformation from an activity conducted exclusively by the CIA into an interagency counter-disinformation effort.〔 == Background == In the early days of the Cold War, the CIA tracked Soviet disinformation and forgeries, but only periodically attempted to expose them. During the 1970s the U.S. chose not to fight back against Soviet active measures for two reasons. The first is that policy makers did not want to let what they saw as “unnecessary confrontation” to sidetrack progress on more important issues such as strategic arms control. The second reason was the disgrace of the CIA.〔 During the Vietnam War, Johnson had ordered the CIA to monitor certain American citizens, notably the Black power and antiwar movements, which he feared were supported and infiltrated by foreign communists. Eventually this and similar monitoring programs were revealed to the public, prompting major public contention and major reforms of the CIA. The CIA was particularly damaged by the Senate (Church Committee) and House (Pike Committee) Intelligence Committees, and then did little to respond to anti-American disinformation. In October 1979 Stanislav Levchenko, head of the Active Measures Line of the KGB Rezidentura in Tokyo, contacted American officials and was granted political asylum in the United States. Levchenko explained the workings of the Soviet apparatus and how it was carried out, under his direction, in Japan. Levchenko’s information, combined with that of Ladislav Bittman, who had been the deputy head of the Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service’s Disinformation Department, was instrumental in helping the CIA understand many of the operations that were being carried out against the United States.〔 This information was also reported to policy makers and Congress. Under the Reagan Administration, the United States began openly challenging Soviet disinformation and active measures.〔 The Interagency Active Measures Working Group was encouraged by the interest of William Casey, Director of the CIA, high level State Department support like such from Lawrence Eagleburger, and the input of John Lenczowski of the National Security Council.〔 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Active Measures Working Group」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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